File Name: rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies .zip
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Calling attention to the relatively few contributions made by sociologists to the study of nuclear issues, a political scientist suggests a number of areas and questions that sociology may be particularly well equipped to deal with. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Google Scholar. Bernstein, Elizabeth et al.
It is one of five objectives that punishment is thought to achieve; the other four objectives are denunciation , incapacitation for the protection of society , retribution and rehabilitation. Criminal deterrence theory has two possible applications: the first is that punishments imposed on individual offenders will deter or prevent that particular offender from committing further crimes; the second is that, public knowledge that certain offences will be punished has a generalised deterrent effect which prevents others from committing crimes. Two different aspects of punishment may have an impact on deterrence. The first relates to the certainty of punishment ; by increasing the likelihood of apprehension and punishment, this may have a deterrent effect. The second relates to the severity of punishment ; how severe the punishment is for a particular crime may influence behavior if the potential offender concludes that the punishment is so severe, it is not worth the risk of getting caught. An underlying principle of deterrence is that it is utilitarian or forward-looking. As with rehabilitation, it is designed to change behaviour in the future rather than simply provide retribution or punishment for current or past behaviour.
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later. Citations per year. Duplicate citations. The following articles are merged in Scholar. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article.
Deterrence theory refers broadly to a body of academic work that came to dominate the security studies literature in the United States and western Europe shortly after World War II. Rather, the literature is characterized by a number of distinct research thrusts that are oftentimes at odds with one another. It should be no surprise to learn, therefore, that the body of literature that delineates the field is at once large, intellectually diverse, conceptually vibrant, and politically relevant.
Several recent books have argued that comparative case studies of crises demonstrate the failure of rational-deterrence theory; they have offered certain empirical generalizations as substitutes. This paper shows that such contentions are unwarranted. First, the empirical generalizations are impressive as historical insights, but they do not meet the standards for theory set out by the most sophisticated case-study analysts themselves.