the politics power and pathologies of international organizations pdf

The politics power and pathologies of international organizations pdf

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The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations

Introduction

International Organizations

What International Bureaucrats (Really) Want

An international organization intergovernmental organization is an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal by personality, such as the United Nations , the World Health Organization and NATO. Additionally, entities including states may hold observer status.

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The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations

The recent crop of International Relations IR literature dedicated to International Organisations IOs is reflective of the evolution of their importance as actors in the international community. The last fifteen years have witnessed seminal publications that offer different interpretations of the role of IOs from entirely new vantage points.

But despite the growing size of the literature, it still suffers from incoherence and fragmentation. The lines of arguments are not as clear cut as in other areas of IR. Most importantly, autonomy is defined too variedly. Whilst neoliberalists incorrectly measure autonomy as the extent to which an IO behaves independently, constructivists define it through the creation of cultural norms and meanings. For that reason, it is imperative to point out that IOs differ immensely in size, structure and purpose.

To do so would be to fall victim to the same intellectual rigidity in the earlier literature, that relies solely on theoretical assumptions. But critically, this is not the source of their autonomy. It is rather a symptom of the structural problems with the delegation of the Principal-agent PA paradigm.

The constructivist approach is more fruitful, but still has its limits. Realism and its successive schools of neorealism and even neoliberalism approach international relations through a state-centric ontology. Realist scholars have traditionally paid little attention to IOs and, where they have, IOs are viewed as as conduit through which powerful states can achieve their geo-political goals.

If not outdated, then it is certainly in need of some empirical validation. The most restricting feature of the realist school is its tendency to view IOs as dutiful servants. One main reason for the creation of IOs is their ability to offer superior intellectuality on specialised areas. But it is important to note that staff will have their own career goals. Armies can defect. Unions can strike. Bureaucracies too, can behave unfavourably to their creators. Thus IOs can possess both a political personality and self-interests at an individual level.

The problem with overlooking such basic human tendencies comes into acute focus once we understand the structural influences of IO behaviour. Nevertheless, the statist assertions that institutions have no effect on state behaviour in the realist school run contrary to the historical truth.

The Bank exhibited unruly behaviour for almost the entirety of the s in a series of detrimental environmental policy choices in Brazil and Indonesia that prompted changes in policies of its member states and eventually institutional reform of the organisation. At the crux of the PA logic: sometimes it is more costly for states to apply mechanisms of control than it is to allow agents more discretion. The Bank offers services that states are unwilling and sometimes unable to provide themselves.

States need the Bank and on an ongoing basis. Thus neoliberalists argue the costs of monitoring Bank slippage was for a long time greater than awarding them a wide scope of delegation. The fact that the Bank were able to run amok for so long is a symptom of the structural inadequacies in their delegation — but not of their independence. Tierney and Nielsen show that the Bank is subject to both collective and multiple principals.

Firstly, the fact that reforms necessitated a coalition of its most powerful principals serves to uphold the realist tradition. In the end, the Bank was subject to the will of the G-7 states. Importantly , t he Bank increased environmentalist professionals to prevent future mishaps. Finally, and most importantly, the fact that the Bank misused their delegated authority does not represent autonomy, it represents autonomous behaviour.

Should we really equate rogue behaviour with independence? There are other, more compelling, sources of independence, put forward by the constructivist school. The primary source of Bank independence is from its expertise and knowledge. Such autonomy has even led to counter-productive IO policies. SAP programs saw the institutional reorganisation of the political economies of developing countries.

In the case of Africa at least, the imposition of neoliberal policies had devastating effects. By contrast to the Bank, the UNSC is viewed on the world stage as a more transparent tool for which powerful states can achieve their interests. Its actions are highly visible and determine the outcome of conflict and warfare.

The council consists of five permanent members, the US, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China and ten additional elected members, who serve a strict 2-year term. The extensive use of the P5 veto in the Israel-Palestine conflict for example has left a somewhat ambivalent official stance towards the conflict.

Although we cannot predict the voting patters without such aid, the existence of informal means of political manipulation renders the UNSC, and other IOs, a political trading accessory. The constructivist school cannot account for this. Nevertheless, as maintained earlier, there are other sources of independence.

The neoliberalist approach sees the preference heterogeneity of the UN as a source of power in the case of Iraq — bringing credibility to the screening function. To a lesser extent than the Bank, the UNSC enjoys a level of neutrality — derived from their technocratic expertise. Voeten provides qualitative research to show that states look to the UNSC to ascertain the level of opposition they might face from other actors, including at home. Thus, the case of Iraq shows us that the UNSC possessed power from perceived neutrality as opposed to genuine political independence.

To conclude, IOs can become autonomous sites of authority but they are never wholly independent actors. Their influence derives from their bureaucratic capacity. Namely, the IOs concentration of expertise gives them a neutral quality that states cannot compete with. The Bank has been played a pivotal role in global development policy and the UNSC — albeit to a lesser extent — has set standards in the security realm.

IOs are also pluralistic in nature and therefore can behave pathologically. But this should not be confused with independence. There is no one school of thought to adequately explain the variation in IO independence. Whilst this essay borrows the realist rationale, it shows that its deficiencies are unable to explain recent trends. Subscribers of neoliberalism have contributed valuable quantitative findings to show why principals delegate and when that delegation is exploited.

However, its understanding of the role of IOs is distorted by its flawed causal logic — measuring independence as slack. Constructivist arguments are the most relevant — showing how IOs influence the world as a yardstick of norms. Yet even constructivism cannot account for all IOs. IOs can and continue to be independent influencers of state behaviour.

But changes can only be made through mutual policy adjustment — they will never have the institutional capacity to relentlessly pursue their own agenda. This hypothesis should sufficiently explain the varying roles of the World Bank and the United Nations Security Council in the geopolitical landscape.

Barnett, M. International Organization , 53 04 , pp. Dreher, A. European Economic Review , 53 7 , pp. Finnemore, M. International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and science policy.

International Organization , 47 04 , p. George, Susan and Fabrizio Sabelli London: Penguin. Haftel, Y. The Independence of International Organizations.

Journal of Conflict Resolution , 50 2 , pp. Hawkins, D. Delegation and agency in international organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johnson, T. The Journal of Politics , 75 1 , pp. Kuziemko, I. Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy , 5 , pp.

Mahmood, F. Perceptions , 18 4 , pp. Mearsheimer, J. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security , 19 3 , p. Nelson, P. Palgrave Macmillan. Nielson, D. International Organization , 57 Thompson, A. International Organization , 60 Voeten, E. International Organization , 59

Introduction

The recent crop of International Relations IR literature dedicated to International Organisations IOs is reflective of the evolution of their importance as actors in the international community. The last fifteen years have witnessed seminal publications that offer different interpretations of the role of IOs from entirely new vantage points. But despite the growing size of the literature, it still suffers from incoherence and fragmentation. The lines of arguments are not as clear cut as in other areas of IR. Most importantly, autonomy is defined too variedly. Whilst neoliberalists incorrectly measure autonomy as the extent to which an IO behaves independently, constructivists define it through the creation of cultural norms and meanings. For that reason, it is imperative to point out that IOs differ immensely in size, structure and purpose.


International Relations scholars have vigorous theories to explain why international organizations (IOs) are created, but they have paid little attention to IO.


International Organizations

Health-related IGOs have grown more numerous and more powerful but also more contested. This chapter explores the role of health-related IGOs in two main sections. The second section explores dynamics of change in and between health-related IGOs. The aim of the chapter is to outline productive cross-fertilization between the global health and IGO literatures.

Barnett and Martha Finnemore International Organization , , vol. This blind spot flows logically from the economic theories of organization that have dominated the study of international institutions and regimes. To recover the agency and autonomy of IOs, we offer a constructivist approach.

Some international agreements create international organizations, which are institutions that set rules for nations and provide venues for diplomacy. In recent years, multinational corporations MNCs have also had a significant impact on the international system. IGOs and NGOs exist for a variety of reasons, such as controlling the proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, supervising trade, maintaining military alliances, ending world hunger, and fostering the spread of democracy and peace. IGOs form when governments make an agreement or band together.

What International Bureaucrats (Really) Want

Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: Barnett and M. Barnett , M.

Приступайте. - Мы не успеем! - крикнула Соши.  - На это уйдет полчаса. К тому времени все уже рухнет. Джабба открыл рот, готовый что-то сказать, но тут его буквально парализовал душераздирающий крик. Все повернули головы к Сьюзан Флетчер, которая выпрямилась и поднялась со стула.

Can International Organisations Become “Autonomous Sites of Authority”?

Tine Hanrieder

Оно показалось ей нескончаемо долгим. Наконец Стратмор заговорил. В его голосе слышалось скорее недоумение, чем шок: - Что ты имеешь в виду. - Хейл… - прошептала Сьюзан.  - Он и есть Северная Дакота. Снова последовало молчание: Стратмор размышлял о том, что она сказала.

Стратмор вскинул брови. - С какой целью. - Танкадо мог посылать фиктивные сообщения на неиспользованный адрес в надежде, что мы его обнаружим и решим, что он обеспечил себе защиту. В таком случае ему не нужно будет передавать пароль кому-то. Возможно, он работал в одиночку.

3 comments

  • Gifford S. 02.06.2021 at 12:33

    The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. Do international organizations really do what.

    Reply
  • Leah M. 07.06.2021 at 07:31

    The recent debate on administrative bodies in international organizations has brought forward multiple theoretical perspectives, analytical frameworks, and methodological approaches.

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