countries and capitals and currencies and presidents and prime ministers 2015 pdf

Countries and capitals and currencies and presidents and prime ministers 2015 pdf

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ASEAN Member States

History and Characteristics

European Issues and Interviews. European Issues. Abstract : The question that the British will be asked in a few months' time has the merit of being clear: "Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in or leave the European Union? Faced with the euro sceptics in his own party as well as those of UKIP, on the right, David Cameron is attempting to bring British public opinion around to choosing to stay in the European Union, after renegotiating the UK's status with its partners. The negotiation taking place with regard to the Brexit is not therefore merely British, it concerns the whole of the European Union.

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It is still controversial as to whether it started a new era in Turkish foreign policy, or it maintained wider changes in foreign policy strategy before it came to power. Traditional Turkish policy which was solidly anchored to the West and the preservation of status quo, arguably barred it from developing close relations with the Islamic world in general, and the Middle Eastern countries in particular.

In the name of multi-dimensional and pro-active foreign policy, the JDP government spared no effort in improving relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours. The bulk of the literature draws attention to the domestic transformation of Turkey, underlining the declining influence of the security oriented Kemalist elites in power, de-securitisation of political Islam and the Kurdish issue in national politics, the orientation of new Islamist elite that seized power, and the growing influence of the so-called Anatolian tigers, a wide number of Turkish entrepreneurs spread across various cities in Anatolia, on politics.

Accordingly, new regional geopolitics combined with domestic transformation inside the country has led to the rise of close relations between Turkey and Iran. Iran was keen on keeping its relationship with Turkey on a satisfactory course for several reasons. The first of them was the growing Iranian security concerns especially after the American occupation of Iraq in The increasing pressure over Iran compelled it to stabilise its relations with Turkey.

Although Turkish membership in NATO has been viewed as a peril for Iran, in order to counterweigh increasing American pressure, the Iranian government has paid special attention to developing good relations with Turkey, and at least to ensure its neutrality in case of a showdown between Iran and the United States. Successive Iranian governments have adopted a seductive approach towards Turkey to reduce bilateral tensions, and increase cooperation in various fields.

However, Iranian-Turkish collaboration has not been seamless over this time. Considering the diplomatic engagements between Ankara and Tehran, it would be wise to divide the Turkish-Iranian relationship into three distinct periods. In the period of rapprochement that began in and lasted till , they expanded bilateral diplomatic, security, and economic relations. Additionally, they had ostensibly similar views with respect to regional developments, yet they deliberately avoided introducing a regional cooperation perspective to their bilateral relations.

The second period, the period of estrangement that covers the years between and , was marked by divergence and competition between the two parties especially on regional matters subsequent to the Arab Spring of , which coincided with a lapse in their security cooperation. However, Ankara and Tehran have maintained economic and diplomatic relations at a reasonable level which culminated in the institutionalisation of bilateral relations. The third period may be called the era of development of amicable relations that began in The JDP government appreciated the Iranian support for it against the futile coup attempt in July , and revised its foreign policy orientation.

Then, in addition to preserving their accord on the economy, they reconciled their differences on regional issues and engaged in coordinating their regional policies and security strategies. The fluctuations in Turkish-Iranian relations during this time could be traced through a review of diplomatic and economic relations as well as through the implications of regional context on their relationship in the subsequent sections.

They were also particularly interested in developing a bond with the EU, and avoided irking the West by holding back on developing better relations with Iran. Additionally, there was heavy pressure by the United States on Ankara for forcing it to cooperate with the US administration against Iran and Syria.

Hence, the JDP leaders were careful in justifying their engagements with Iran by either suggesting economic considerations, or arguing for integrating Iran into the regional politics so that it would turn into a responsible actor in Middle Eastern politics.

Thus, the JDP government was directed and emboldened to improve its relations with Iran. The top issue on his agenda was the pending American military intervention against Iraq. Iran shared similar concerns with Turkey regarding the implications of the American intervention. Tehran was also concerned with the American military presence in Iraq which might turn into a centre for its hostile activities in order to force a regime change in Iran, and a prospective Kurdish state in that country.

This context paved the ground for growing security cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. The dismissal of large-scale Turkish investments because of factional bickering inside Iran led the then President Mohammad Khatami to cancel his projected visit to Turkey. Preceding this, the PKK had changed its name several times in order to overcome international pressures.

Occasionally they staged coordinated offensives against the PKK. For instance, subsequent to the bloody PKK attacks in October , Ali Babacan, the then Turkish foreign minister visited Tehran as part of the Turkish diplomatic strategy to secure international support for a prospective Turkish military raid inside Iraq in order to fight the PKK. In his meeting with Babacan, Manouchehr Mottaki, his Iranian counterpart, claimed that the United States and Israel were behind the rise of terrorist activities, but avoided a clear backing for the projected Turkish military operation against the PKK.

Instead, he argued that there were alternatives other than military operations for the solution of the issue. The agreement, which has provided an institutional framework for Turkish-Iranian security cooperation, includes a definition of terrorist activities, the exchange of information and intelligence on groups and individuals involved in transnational organised crime, equipment and the details of terrorist groups identified by the parties.

The parties assigned the High Security Commission to oversee security relations and update the list of commonly designated terrorist organisations. The joint working committee was supposed to meet once a year. Once the JDP came to power in Turkey, it adopted a cautious approach towards the controversial Iranian nuclear program.

The Turkish security elite continued to consider a prospective nuclear Iran as a threat to Turkey and the region. Obama, who promised peaceful solution of the nuclear controversy through dialogue with Iran, was elected to be the new President of the United States in November However, by then, neither of the parties were willing to recognise Turkey as the mediator. They also signed a joint declaration on enhancing energy cooperation. Accordingly, Turkey and Iran did not allow the prevalence of their sectarian differences over bilateral relations.

By then, the JDP government had adopted a more pro-Iranian position with respect to the nuclear case than its previously cautious approach. Additionally, Turkey and Iran developed similar positions with regard to regional issues.

Instead, he suggested that regional countries should take the initiative and lead cooperation for the solution of regional matters. He added that Turkey and Iran should try to be amicable for the solution of regional issues. By that time, the total volume of trade between the two countries had reached to ten billion US dollars.

In this respect, Turkish and Iranian officials discussed the establishment of free trade zones and joint industrial towns in border regions, the introduction of national currencies in bilateral trade, and the development of banking relations.

Additionally, they signed a memorandum of understanding confirming previous energy protocols between Ankara and Tehran. However, the declaration was rejected by the Vienna group, including the United States.

In combination, these developments heated the debate on the shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. To complement the picture for the critics of the JDP foreign policy, Turkey opposed attempts to name Iran as a potential threat within the framework of the missile defence shield program of NATO, in the summit meeting held in Lisbon, in October However, when the waves of anti-regime protests reached Syria in March , Turkey and Iran adopted contradictory policies towards developments there, which overshadowed their relations for some time.

Whereas Turkey favoured and supported the opposition movements, Iran stood with the Assad administration. Actually, considering the security anxieties of Iran and to preserve good neighbourly relations, Turkey was initially reluctant to that concession and prevented any particular reference to Iran as the perceived source of threat. However, partly because of the growing pressure on Turkey, and partly because of their differences in regional issues, Turkey accepted the decision in September Subsequently, President Ahmadinejad cancelled his planned visit to Konya, Turkey, to participate in the annual Shab-e Arus ceremonies to commemorate Mawlana Jalal ad-Din Rumi at the last minute, arguably in protest of the deployment of the radar.

Firstly, by the autumn of it appeared that the two countries could not coordinate their actions against the PKK and the PJAK in the north of Iraq. Turkish officials contended that Iran had ceased to share intelligence with Turkey on the activities of the PKK. The ensuing clashes between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK militants led to a considerable number of casualties.

Many people in the Turkish media and among the security officials interpreted these developments as evidence of Iranian support for the PKK within the framework of its strategy to compel Ankara to step back from its proactive engagements in Iraq and Syria.

To complement the picture, some Iranian officials made statements asking Turkey to keep out of Syria and focus on its own internal affairs. In return, Ramin Mehmanparast, then spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Affairs, claimed that Turkey was making a miscalculation with regard to Syria. However, Khamenei reiterated the Iranian position of support for the Assad administration and its opposition to foreign interference in Syrian domestic politics.

The Turkish-Iranian divergence on the Syrian crisis remained a thorny issue in bilateral relations, and mutual accusations continued through the media. Furthermore, he declared Turkish support for the Saudi military intervention against the Huthi advances in Yemen, and asked Iran to withdraw its forces from there. Turkey challenged the unilateral sanctions of the EU and the United States against Iran, and encouraged its tradesmen to enhance their economic transactions.

As a result, the volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran amounted to twenty-two billion dollars in In this regard, Ankara hosted a new round of negotiations in April , while Istanbul hosted numerous technical meetings between the parties. While the long-awaited preferential trade agreement was supposed to boost bilateral economic relations, the establishment of the HCC provided an institutional mechanism to stabilise and strengthen different aspects of Turkish-Iranian relations.

The visit of Rouhani was marked by the conclusion of ten cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding in various respects. Anxious about a deal that would supposedly make Iran more powerful and aggressive in regional politics, a great number of the elite were concerned with the implications of the deal on Turkish-Iranian relations.

Conversely, another group of the elite welcomed a deal that would purportedly provide new opportunities in bilateral relations. Iranian officials criticised the JDP government for fuelling extremists in Syria for the sake of overthrowing Assad. The rising political tension between Ankara and Tehran coincided with the rise of PKK attacks inside Turkey, which led to the revival of discussions on Iranian support for the terrorist organisation. He talked about the significance of the interaction between Ankara and Tehran with reference to regional matters, albeit that they might have different views and interests.

Thus, a new understanding was about to develop between Ankara and Tehran on regional issues. However, the JDP government deliberately avoided engaging in a regional scheme exclusively with Iran. New dynamics that emerged across the Middle East subsequent to the Arab Spring, compelled both capitals to reconsider their regional policies. First of all, the landscape of war among antagonistic groups in Syria dramatically changed. The opposition groups fighting against the Assad administration failed to establish a united front.

Furthermore, they divided into numerous rival groups that contributed to the rise of extremist groups reinforced by foreign fighters. Consequently, international initiatives that brought some Arab and Western states led by the United States along with Turkey aimed at promoting a power transition in Syria, faded away. Through the strong backing of Iran and militia groups mobilised by Iran, the regime forces gained a strong hand vis-a-vis the opposition. The military involvement of Russia alongside the Assad rule in September provided the military superiority for the regime forces to recover most territories that it had previously lost to the opposition fighters.

Combined with the aforementioned developments, both the Russian and the American interest in this Kurdish group that seized considerable territory in the north of Syria, compelled Ankara and Tehran to review their regional differences, especially with regard to Syria.

It perpetrated numerous terrorist attacks in the respective countries. Thus, the rise of ISIS turned into a common security concern for both countries. In the midst of an international and regional campaign to fight against ISIS, the leader of the KRG Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq , Masoud Barzani put forward an idea to hold a referendum for the prospective independence of the Kurdish entity.

Furthermore, immediately after the liberation of some territories that were disputed between Erbil and Baghdad by the Kurdish peshmerga from ISIS control, the KRG set September 25, , as the date of the referendum. The Kurdish bid for independence drew the ire of both Ankara and Tehran which started to coordinate their efforts with Baghdad in order to prevent the independence of the KRG. Despite the misgivings between Ankara and Tehran for a number of reasons in the preceding years, Iran extended its support for the elected government against the coup plotters.

Turkish-Iranian diplomatic exchanges were accelerated and paved the ground for increasing diplomatic and security cooperation between them, related to the Syria crisis and the KRG bid for independence.

On December 20, , Iranian, Russian, and Turkish foreign ministers met in Moscow and issued a joint declaration. The Moscow declaration reiterated the shared commitment of the parties for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria, and to fight jointly against ISIS and al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated extremist organisation. They also declared their willingness to be the guarantors of a prospective agreement that would be negotiated between the Syrian opposition and the government, which inaugurated the Astana process.

In fact, since the Islamic revolution, the security elite in both countries were skeptical towards one another. Then the high-level Turkish and Iranian officials gave strong messages for the development of a security cooperation between Ankara and Tehran, and for their resolved opposition to the independence bid of the KRG.

ASEAN Member States

Africa is a very rich continent with very colorful landscapes and bright weather contrasts. How many countries in Africa, how many presidents, and what is the mainland in general? If you are interested in the political map of Africa, then this article is completely for you. We present to you a list of African countries and their current presidents. It will be interesting. Africa is the second largest continent after Eurasia. From the north, the African land is washed by the Mediterranean Sea, from the northeast by the Red Sea, by the Indian Ocean by the east and south, and by the Atlantic from the west.

It is headquartered in Jakarta. A list of member states is provided below. Also listed are participants of the ASEAN Regional Forum ARF , an organisation throughout the Asia-Pacific region whose objectives are to foster dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region. The ASEAN is an organisation on the Southeast Asian region that aims to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development among its members and to promote regional peace. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Main article: East Asia Summit.

History and Characteristics

This is a list of current foreign ministers of the United Nations member states as well as the Holy See Vatican City. Foreign ministers of sovereign countries with limited recognition , some alternative governments, some dependent territories and some autonomous administrative divisions are included in separate tables. The following states control their territory and are recognized by at least one UN member state.

The following chart lists countries and dependencies along with their capital cities, in English as well as any additional official language s. Latin Italian. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Wikipedia list article.

Madagascar Country Report 2020

With so many small islands, teaching or learning the geography of the Caribbean can be a big task. These were signs of land. Printable map of the Caribbean region, including islands, countries, capitals and main cities.

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