File Name: security challenge and defense in voip infrastructures .zip
Bakhtiari, S. IT Management Studies , 7 25 ,
VoIP is a class of new technologies that deliver voice calls over the packet-switched networks, which surpasses the legacy circuit-switched telecom telephony. By testing Android from version 7. The security consequences are serious, including denying voice calls, caller ID spoofing, unauthorized call operations, and remote code execution.
VoIP is a class of new technologies that deliver voice calls over the packet-switched networks, instead of the legacy circuit-switched telecom networks, i. By transmitting the voice data over the Internet, VoIP offers clear benefits over the PSTN calling service, including improved quality of service, high-fidelity codecs, and lower monetary costs. Existing works on Android VoIP security, however, are far from comprehensive. They focused either on the weaknesses of VoIP network infrastructure, e.
Notably, Li et al. Furthermore, we identify all the four potential attack surfaces that allow physical, local, remote, and nearby attacks against Android VoIP. Lastly, we combine automatic fuzzing tests with targeted code auditing, including log-driven and protocol specification based auditing, to eventually determine vulnerabilities.
The incurred security consequences include denying voice calls, caller ID spoofing, unauthorized call operations, and remote code execution. New and comprehensive vulnerability assessment results, with nine zero-day vulnerabilities analyzed and their root causes uncovered Sect.
Before presenting our work, we first introduce the necessary background on VoIP and Android in this section. It can also perform routing control and check the integrity of SIP messages. A SIP call involves three phases: the initial signaling phase, the conversation phase, and the end signaling phase. There are four kinds of Android components, including the user interface based Activity , the long-running Service , the event-triggered Broadcast Rec- eiver , and the database-like Content Provider.
In this paper, besides system-level vulnerabilities, we also uncover one component hijacking vulnerability in a popular VoIP application. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to give this demystification. It also provides a few API classes via the android. Supporting these codecs relies on libstagefright. It is a high-privilege app under the Linux user group of radio. Hence, it can not only access typical phone-related permissions e.
Additionally, displaying VoIP caller numbers is handled by the system dialer app com. It is worth noting that these VoIP components are not isolated in Android. Although such attack is rare, it still needs to be considered, as we will demonstrate in Sect. Local Attack Surface: Since the system phone app is a privileged app, it can access not only permission-protected resources but also system interfaces in Telephone Manager and Radio Interface Layer RIL.
Remote Attack Surface: Since the phone needs to communicate with outside via IP and mobile communication, it brings another attack surface. These nearby Bluetooth devices bring a new attack surface. On one hand, the malicious payload in VoIP traffic may reach to the system Bluetooth components. On the other hand, the malicious traffic from Bluetooth devices may also attack VoIP components. In this approach, we first automatically test Android VoIP components via on-device and network-side fuzzing, and further combine them with targeted code auditing to eventually determine vulnerabilities.
In this section, we present these three modules, among which network-side packet fuzzing is the most special one. The on-device fuzzing framework, with not only the conventional Intent fuzzing but also the creative system API fuzzing based on Java reflection. On-Device Fuzzing Framework. As shown in Fig. We use a drozer console on PC to control the fuzzing process on a test phone via its drozer agent.
For both Intent and system API fuzzing, we perform these three steps: identifying exposed surfaces, mutating parameters, and recording logs. On-Device Intent Fuzzing. To mutate Intent parameters, we try both empty i.
In the system API fuzzing, exposed surfaces are those unprotected system service interfaces. We then launch targeted fuzzing against these exposed service interfaces according to their parameter types. Setting up the Testbed. Fuzzing Different Protocols. We leverage mjSIP uac. Additionally, we install an AutoAnswer app in the Android phone to automate the entire fuzzing process.
The detailed fuzzing code is shown in Fig. Specifically, we first prepare a seed file called sample-gsm For example, we can mutate RTP headers by setting an Ethercap filter, which can specify which packet to filter and how to manipulate. The mutated new packets will be then forwarded to the Android phone. Log-Driven Auditing.
Both on-device and network-side generate a number of fuzzing logs. We thus leverage them for a log-driven code auditing. Specifically, for a process crash produced by our fuzzing, we can collect either a Java exception for Java components e. Moreover, we can obtain the detailed location where the code encounters an error, e.
We then use these code locations to driven our auditing. Protocol Specification Based Auditing. For example, special attributes, e. We then leverage this kind of protocol specification differences for an efficient auditing. Since this is a periodic fuzzing effort i.
By performing on-device fuzzing, we find that Android VoIP generally protects its local attack surface, with only one vulnerability discovered by the system API fuzzing and no vulnerable component identified by the Intent fuzzing. To also demonstrate the effectiveness of our Intent fuzzing, we test and identify a VoIP vulnerability in a very popular app called VK 1 , which has cumulatively over million installs on Google Play.
The VK app version 5. However, our fuzzing shows that any app without the permission can also invoke the APIs, because no checking is enforced by QtilMS. As a result, an on-device malicious app can misuse those two privileged APIs to set unauthorized call transfer. In this scenario, the victim user cannot answer or reject a call, because no button is shown up.
If the adversary frequently launches this undeniable VoIP call spam, the victim has to disable the network connection or shutdown her phone. To defend against this attack, Google restricts the length of SIP user name.
It tries to return the caller number in the CLCC response, but uses only a byte array dialnum to store it. A stack buffer overflow thus happens when a caller number with more than bytes is inputted. This vulnerability allows an adversary to overwrite the return address of the ClccResponse function, causing remote code execution. This vulnerability is similar to V5, but it is triggered when the call state changes, i. In this example, developers also did not expect the long caller number in a VoIP call.
Since the Open image in new window variable now is an unsigned negative number, it becomes a very large positive integer, which eventually triggers the abort checking statement and causes remote DoS.
Compared to the DoS in V4, triggering DoS in V6 requires a Bluetooth device connected, but just needs to receive, rather than answer, a call. To patch V5 and V6, Google restricted the length of caller number inputted in the Bluetooth module.
However, such convention should not apply to VoIP calls, which is unfortunately ignored by the dialer app. But here it worsens the severity instead.
Besides the vulnerability-level cause analysis in Sect. Among the nine vulnerabilities we discovered, three of them have previously known root causes, i.
For the rest of six vulnerabilities, we identify a new root cause that is dedicated to Android VoIP and not known before. In this section, we present the closely related research on VoIP security, protocol fuzzing, and Android dynamic testing. VoIP Security. Recently, with the high popularity of Android phones and mobile networks, researchers started to investigate the security of VoIP apps and network infrastructure in the real world.
In particular, both Li et al. Compared with all these works, we are the first to systematically study the security of system-level VoIP implementation on Android, with 8 zero-day vulnerabilities identified and confirmed by Google. Protocol Fuzzing. Our network-side fuzzing in Sect.
Very recently, Pham et al. Android Dynamic Testing. Our on-device fuzzing in Sect. Furthermore, our on-device fuzzing is an unified framework that performs both Intent and System API fuzzing. These vulnerabilities caused serious security consequences, including denying voice calls, caller ID spoofing, unauthorized call operations, and remote code execution.
Skip to Main Content. A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of humanity. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions. The flexibility of the VoIP system and the convergence of voice and data networks brings with it additional security risks. These are in addition to the common security concerns faced by the underlying IP data network facilities that a VoIP system relies on.
Voice communication in recent trends has shown rapid growth in homes and businesses with the development of Voice over Internet Protocol VoIP. The Session initiation protocol being an application layer protocol helps to create session between the caller and the called for bidirectional communication using SIP messages. The VoIP became targeted victim of different attacks as internet became the medium of transmission.
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Voice over Internet Protocol VoIP , also called IP telephony , is a method and group of technologies for the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions over Internet Protocol IP networks, such as the Internet.
VoIP is a class of new technologies that deliver voice calls over the packet-switched networks, which surpasses the legacy circuit-switched telecom telephony. By testing Android from version 7. The security consequences are serious, including denying voice calls, caller ID spoofing, unauthorized call operations, and remote code execution. VoIP is a class of new technologies that deliver voice calls over the packet-switched networks, instead of the legacy circuit-switched telecom networks, i. By transmitting the voice data over the Internet, VoIP offers clear benefits over the PSTN calling service, including improved quality of service, high-fidelity codecs, and lower monetary costs. Existing works on Android VoIP security, however, are far from comprehensive.
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